Identifying the interests of users as citizens, consumers, publics and workers by Livingstone, Sonia
  
Sonia Livingstone  
 
Identifying the interests of users as citizens, 
consumers, publics and workers 
 
Book section 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Originally published in Gillespie, T., Boczkowski, P.J. and Foot, K., (eds.) Media technologies: 
essays on communication, materiality, and society. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 2014, pp. 
241-250. ISBN 9780262525374 
 
 
© 2014 The MIT Press  
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62127/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2015 
 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s submitted version of the book section. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 1 
Original citation: 
Livingstone, S. (2014) Identifying the interests of users as citizens, consumers, 
publics and workers. In Gillespie, T., Boczkowski, P.J., & Foot, K. (Eds), 
Media Meets Technology: Studying Information and Communication 
Technologies in the Digital Era (pp.241-250). MIT Press. 
 
 
12. Identifying the Interests of Digital Users as 
Audiences, Consumers, Workers, and Publics 
Sonia Livingstone 
Introduction—Why Consider Users? 
I was asked to act as discussant on the chapters by Greg Downey, Tarleton 
Gillespie, Chris Kelty, and Steven Jackson as if we were all together at a 
conference. Conference delegates—like most audiences—listen for a purpose, 
relating what they hear to their prior standpoint. You, too, as my reader, start 
from somewhere particular, doubtless wondering what I have to say. While all 
the chapters in this volume are concerned with the shifting relations among 
communication technologies, social practices, and institutions of power—put 
simply, with how to imagine what the Internet could and should be (Mansell 
2012)—I shall contrast their various conceptions of the ordinary person whose 
interests are so vitally at stake in the digital era. Should you be used to 
regarding the producer as more important than the consumer, the text more 
subtle than its various actualizations by readers, or the technology more 
fascinating than its uses, then I hope to persuade you that the study of media, 
communication, and information technologies should always address the 
activities of users in context. Only thus can we uncover the social shaping and 
social consequences of the digital (Lievrouw and Livingstone 2006). 
My degree of linguistic artifice—encoded by the nineteenth-century 
novelist through a direct address to the “dear reader”—signals that, as a reader 
of these four chapters, addressing the reader of this text, I hope to illuminate 
the reader or user of digital technologies more generally. In my own work, I 
have examined the interpretative agency of television audiences (Livingstone 
1998), their contested relations with publics (Livingstone 2005), and the 
fraught ways they are framed as citizens or consumers in policy discourses 
(Lunt and Livingstone 2012). Given this horizon of expectations (Jauss 1982), 
you will not be surprised that I am interested in how these conceptions of the 
ordinary person (itself no simple idea [Thumim 2012]) resonate or contrast 
 2 
across the four chapters, implicitly or explicitly, in ways that are important for 
our analysis of the communication process. 
But where, you may ask, are the readers or users in the chapter? Surely 
Downey is concerned with the too-often invisible information laborers, 
Gillespie with complex algorithms of which the users have never even heard, 
Kelty with grand questions of freedom and coercion, and Jackson with those 
who repair broken technologies and technological infrastructures. I suggest 
that although their starting points lie with the sociotechnical systems that 
modern globalized societies are so vigorously building, the authors are each, 
in different ways, concerned with the messy realities of everyday life, with 
what is visible or invisible, transparent or opaque in the emerging domain of 
digital infrastructures. Most important, each has a vision of the user (reader) in 
the digital era, as I shall unpack here. Moreover, each fears that the implied 
reader (user) of their own text risks underestimating how the interests of 
digital users are losing out in the unequal struggle that they—and we—are 
engaged in. The collective noun each chapter chooses to foreground this 
struggle is, I suggest, productive for future analysis. 
User as Proletariat 
Digital communication relies on the essential yet routinely underestimated 
work of “human ‘information labor,’” argues Downey, in chapter 8 of this 
volume. We google a question and the answer “comes up.” We check Amazon 
for something to buy and helpful recommendations are instantly at our service. 
We tell our students to research a new topic and the task seems effortless. But 
as Downey rightly observes, this apparent cornucopia is only possible because 
of an invisible army of coders, selectors, translators, and other new 
intermediaries. And because we can’t see them, we naively acknowledge that 
neither their efforts (thereby colluding in their exploitation) nor their 
motivations—or, more accurately, the motivations of their employers—are 
available to our critical scrutiny (thereby undermining our media literacy). 
What are these workers doing? Downey offers three case studies that reveal 
the ordinary lives of these hidden laborers who do what he calls “jumping 
context”—ensuring the efficient distribution of meanings from producer to 
consumer that is essential to the exercise of power. Calling for wider 
recognition of this work, Downey appeals to the media-literate teacher and the 
cultural critic who worry first about the students who, being “digital natives” 
beguiled by the ease of modern interfaces that “free” them from the effort of 
finding information, lack the critical literacy to evaluate what they find, and 
worry second about those who find themselves co-opted to the invisible 
workforce of the information laborer (via crowdsourcing, produsage, or other 
forms of “free labor,” as Tiziana Terranova [2000] has termed it). Somewhat 
contentiously, Downey includes both his students and those scholars excited 
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by the potential for amateur, playful, alternative, or flexible uses of the digital 
environment not only in the former but also in the latter category. 
Presumably following Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1977) post-Marxist 
analysis of “the culture industry,” Downey implies that the two are linked—
the user as consumer is served by the user as worker; indeed, the user as 
consumer by night is, precisely, the user as worker by day. “We” either fall 
into this trap too or we must stand sternly apart and, indeed, seek their rescue. 
In the face of hidden exploitation and imminent struggle, as critics, we must 
promote resistance (Downey gives the example of the Occupy movement as a 
possible direction, though history will judge whether this is a sufficient or 
effective form of resistance). As teachers, we must make the task of 
interpretation harder, not easier, for our students, deconstructing the interface 
and revealing its illegibility behind its apparent legibility; here Downey 
mobilizes a particular version of media literacy, aligned with those for whom 
media represent all-powerful, profit-driven, ideologically exploitative 
institutions that promote pernicious values to their audiences. Other 
conceptions of media literacy, which see no going back from today’s 
thorough-going and ubiquitous mediated environment, aim less to teach 
people to defend against the media and more to engage with and productively 
harness whatever media power they can appropriate for themselves and those 
they may speak for (Frau-Meigs and Torrent 2009; Hobbs 2010). The irony is 
that, for the first conception of media, raising individuals’ media literacy has 
proven to be a weak (though worthy) tool. Possibly, there is more political 
potential for the second conception, insofar as its focus is not to counter the 
power of media owners, but rather to harness the power of the media so as to 
reach the ears of the national or international state and regulatory bodies that 
have power over them (as in media reform or digital rights movements). 
Users as Publics 
Readers and users can be more or less obscured by theory, although they are 
omnipresent come what may. Of the four chapters, I had the least work to do 
in discerning their role in Gillespie’s chapter for, although hardly signaled by 
a title about algorithms, users are at the center of his concern with relevance. 
Algorithms, he argues, represent a new “knowledge logic,” one that is 
displacing the editorial logic of the print era (and, perhaps, the call for much of 
the exploited labor which worries Downey?). To whom or what is this new 
logic relevant? To “our participation in public life” (see chapter 9). In other 
words, to us as democratic citizens, now divided less (or not only) by 
inequalities in the labor market or new stratifications introduced by 
globalization, but rather by all the matters that divide citizens—opinions, 
perspectives, visions of the good society. Thus, Gillespie asks, how are the 
criteria by which we analyze and judge public participation changed in the 
digital era? In the print era, where arguably Jürgen Habermas’s ([1962] 1989) 
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theory of the public sphere best captured the ideals of public participation, 
critics concerned themselves with questions of inclusion, trust, deliberation, 
rationality, and the public good. But in the digital era, we are faced with vast 
and largely inaccessible databases built on unaccountable practices of 
selection, encoding, “cleaning,” “the promise of objectivity,” and, perhaps 
most fascinating, the recursive re-presentation of a “calculated” public back to 
itself (it being no longer the Times letters page but personally tailored 
Facebook “likes” that tell us whether others think as we do). 
Gillespie addresses “us” as citizen-users, as publics (and this is my 
preferred approach; see Livingstone 2005, and Lunt and Livingstone 2012). 
But his fear is that we have already been sold, over our heads, for calculated 
publics that are far from organic (see networked publics, Ito 2008); rather, 
they are the means by which users are transformed into a commodity and sold 
to advertisers. The parallel with Ien Ang’s (1990) analysis of the television 
ratings industry is strong and, like Ang, in chapter 9 Gillespie points to “the 
slippage between the anticipated user and the user themselves.” But while Ang 
was deeply pessimistic about the television and marketing industry, she had 
more faith that the complexities of everyday life escape the raters’ scrutiny—
and thus their data, and inferences drawn from it, are flawed. Like Ang, 
Gillespie is guided by the findings of media ethnographies, a welcome 
inclusion in a volume on science and technology studies; but his concern is, 
rightly, greater. For while he agrees that everyday complexities undermine the 
validity of the “big data” so excitedly being captured by the industry (boyd 
and Crawford 2012), by contrast with television, the Internet industry feeds its 
“findings” back to us as users immediately, relentlessly, and persuasively. 
How can I not fall for the conceit that my weekly Facebook update reveals my 
popularity? And how far can we, as citizens, be properly skeptical of the 
ubiquitous yet insidious re-presentation of public discourse and political 
interests presented to us by Web 2.0? 
Users and Humanity 
Where Downey and Gillespie debate the politics of workers, users, and publics 
in the digital age, Kelty frames his concerns in ethical terms, attempting to 
move beyond the familiar polarization of freedom versus control (or 
exploitation) in order to examine “how new technologies change the meaning 
of freedom itself” (chapter 10, this volume). Kelty elegantly complicates 
Isaiah Berlin’s (1958) familiar distinction between negative freedom 
(“freedom from” interference) and positive freedom (“freedom to” be a self-
directed agent) by observing that negative freedom, commonly associated with 
libertarian ideas of the Internet, conveys a particular vision of liberty whose 
hostility to state intervention in the private sphere (including markets and the 
lifeworld) ends up “forcing a particular kind of liberty on others.” In other 
words, the protection of negative freedoms becomes, necessarily, the 
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promotion of positive freedoms also: as Kelty notes, having advocated for 
freedoms from intervention or control, “it is an easy step to suggest that others 
be coerced in their own interests, that we know what they need better than 
they do themselves.” In relation to the Internet, this paradox is often 
overlooked because, while government interventions are often noticeable and 
therefore contested, “the creation and dissemination of technologies that 
coerce us and that interfere with our goals” tends to operate under the radar of 
critical scrutiny. Yet, as ever more aspects of our civic, personal, and 
intellectual lives become digitally mediated (Hepp 2012), these questions of 
design and implementation become all the more important, the point being not 
to push back against imposing forces but rather to recognize the subtleties of 
coercion “by design” (recall Gillespie’s concern about the obscurity of 
algorithms). 
You may ask, my dear reader, where is the user in all of this? By 
contrast with Downey’s user-as-laborer or Gillespie’s user-as-public, Kelty’s 
user is the most elevated, for it is all humanity: the user who has the right to be 
free, the user who desires to dictate the freedoms of others, the user who, in 
Berlin’s terms, wishes “to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, 
by conscious purposes which are my own” (quoted in Kelty, chapter 10)—
and, now, to do so on the Internet. Yet paradoxically, by underestimating the 
power of technological design, it is precisely this user who, in the digital era, 
risks falling for “a specious disguise for brutal tyranny” (Berlin, quoted in 
chapter 10). Yet as scholars we do believe that we know better what is in the 
interests of users (indeed, of humanity): Kelty’s history of the personal 
computer reveals a driving belief in human emancipation—that technology 
can deliver “a particular vision of positive liberty: creativity, constructive 
learning, expressive communication, the ability to think unconstrained, like an 
artist or a scientist.” Unsurprisingly, then, where Downey calls for media 
literacy, perhaps enabling technologically mediated protest, and where 
Gillespie calls for transparency in the workings of algorithms, Kelty asks users 
to become designers, for “our very ability to become free depends on our 
ability to design it into our technologies.”  
Users as Carers: Ethical Users 
Jackson’s vision—combining politics and ethics—is one of entropy (Arnheim 
1971), of a world relentlessly falling apart, notwithstanding the incessant but 
only temporarily successful efforts of another invisible army of workers to 
rebuild and repair. Elegantly illustrating his argument with an image of a 
once-glamorous ocean liner being dismantled and stripped by Bangladeshi 
shipbreakers, Jackson’s argument takes a step beyond Downey’s emphasis on 
what is now called the problem of “the last mile” (which, as broadband 
providers worry today, is the most troublesome and expensive). For while 
Downey’s messenger boys were essential to completing the communicative 
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process, Jackson’s shipbreakers, who not only strip but also repurpose the 
salvageable parts of the ship, play a necessary (if not-very-powerful, and 
certainly unsung) role. Their literal acts of recycling illustrate the cyclic 
(rather than linear) relation between producer and user in digital 
communication. Still, though the energy is the workers who power the 
process, its direction and influence is determined by the producers. 
Jackson draws on Star and Strauss’s (1999) analysis of the role of 
articulation in sustaining sociotechnical infrastructures (by supporting “the 
smooth interaction of parts” within the whole), but his emphasis on repair is 
devoted to sustaining not altering the communication process. His Bangladeshi 
shipbreakers seem not to deviate or cheat on their task, nor do they strike. 
Similarly, I first thought Downey’s “jumping context” to be akin to what 
anthropologists call the “re-appropriation” of meaning from one context to the 
next (Miller 1987), or what cultural studies analyses call the “circuit of 
culture,” linking political economy and lived culture (Hall 1999; Johnson 
1986). But, more Frankfurt School than cultural or consumption studies, 
Downey’s messenger boys appear to have no agency in the process that 
absorbs them. Yet Stuart Hall’s analysis of articulation (for example, between 
encoding and decoding; Hall 1980) posits a far from smooth interaction, 
instead pointing to a site of struggle over the determination of meaning. Thus a 
focus on the (re)production and circulation of meanings (rather than just their 
distribution) would ask not only how the messenger boys fit into the system of 
communication that relied on them but also whether their labor shaped or 
altered, to some degree, the nature and outcome of the communicative flow, 
indeed, of the circuit of culture. Just as one wonders further about the lives of 
Jackson’s shipbreakers, one might also ask not only what the messengers were 
paid (not enough!) or where they put their hat and coat, but also whether they 
ever lost or altered or even destroyed the messages they were entrusted to 
carry. One might also ask who could not afford to send a message, whether 
there were places they couldn’t or wouldn’t deliver to, and whether they 
organized any protest against their treatment. 
How shall we value the work of these unsung workers and users? 
Where Downey offers a political vision of an exploitative labor market 
underpinning our ubiquitously enjoyed communication apps, Jackson is more 
humanistic, arguing that repair “fills in the moment of hope and fear in which 
bridges from old worlds to new worlds are built, and the continuity of order, 
value, and meaning gets woven, one tenuous thread at a time” (chapter 11, this 
volume). Just as Daniel Miller (1998) argues that shopping—profitable to be 
sure for the supermarkets—is also an act of love by those taking food home to 
their families, Jackson analyzes everyday activities of recycling and repair 
(which are certainly commonplace in any domestic setting for digital media 
use; Livingstone 2002) as “the subtle acts of care by which order and meaning 
. . .  are maintained and transformed.” The last mile may pose the greatest 
challenge for the provider, but to any domestic user, that’s when the invisible 
tasks really begin. Siting, installing, connecting, updating, customizing, and 
 7 
repairing are all everyday tasks associated with digital technologies, and in 
completing these, the circuit is not neatly completed but, rather, significantly 
reshaped: manufacturers’ instructions are not followed, manuals are discarded, 
complex functionality is underused, and workarounds, hacks, and other fixes 
are endemic (Bakardjieva 2005). 
Research on everyday uses and abuses of technology has long sought 
to counter the “productivist bias” of the field that worries Jackson. To advance 
his “repair-centered ethics,” even “a standpoint epistemology of repair,” why 
not start at home, adding users to his list of “neglected” people in the social 
history of technology? Complementing the dominant focus on innovation and 
distribution, Jackson in chapter 11 usefully invites consideration of other 
dimensions of the social life of objects, including unnoticed forms of labor, 
alternative relations of power and, his main focus, an ethics of care 
surrounding the embedding of technological objects in our lives. Yet these can 
only come into focus if we transcend linear conceptions of technological 
innovation, and binary contrasts between producers and consumers—hence 
the value of cyclic thinking. However, can an ethic of care suffice to counter 
the forces of entropy by which all that we humans create continuously 
degrades, decays, and disappears? And what of the capitalist effort to profit 
even from these acts of repair (consider the repair shops springing up on every 
high street, the profits now discovered in “green” businesses, and, of course, 
the motivations of the Bangladeshi shipbreakers’ employers)? I think this 
might be Downey’s reply to Jackson. 
Conclusion 
In his brilliant dissection of literature, Umberto Eco (1984) showed there is 
always an implied reader, conceived by Eco as the combination of textual (or 
design) features that hail, inscribe, and presume familiarity with the 
knowledge and interests of the reader. In this short commentary, I have sought 
to reveal both the reader of this volume (including myself), in order to 
highlight the differences of position that we are, together, debating, but also, 
more important, the user (today’s reader) of digital technologies (as conceived, 
or implied, by our four authors). From my perspective, it is crucial to 
recognize that, as first audience reception and then media ethnography have 
shown, implied readers do not always map precisely onto empirical readers; 
preferred readings encoded into a text are not always decoded as anticipated; 
and media products can be surprisingly, even resistantly appropriated by 
“ordinary people” with, sometimes, problematic consequences for their 
authors, designers, and producers (Bakardjieva 2005; Silverstone 2006). 
Undoubtedly, even acting collectively the public generally lacks the power to 
counter the meanings imposed by global media corporations. Nor, typically, is 
it aware of the conservative meanings embedded in the texts and technologies 
that surround its members. Yet communication is inherently co-constructed, 
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often unpredictable, and thoroughly embedded in the particular contexts that, 
in turn, help shape its direction and outcome. As reception theorist Wolfgang 
Iser elegantly explains, “as the reader passes through the various perspectives 
offered by the text, and relates the different views and patterns to one another, 
he sets the work in motion, and so sets himself in motion too” (1980, 106). 
So, readers and viewers, audiences and publics, users and consumers—
call them what you will—are not dutifully positioned at the end of a well-
planned chain of control, from innovation to production to marketing and 
diffusion and, finally, obedient receipt of the goods or meanings on offer. In 
this commentary, I have built on the text-reader metaphor of cultural studies, 
social semiotics, and reception aesthetics (Hall 1980; Hodge and Kress 1988; 
and Iser 1980, respectively) as extended to theorize the user of new media 
technologies (Livingstone 2004; Woolgar 1996). The concepts of reader and 
user permit recognition of agency, but they tend to underplay the significance 
of collectivities. When positioning agents, individual or aggregated, within a 
larger frame, the choice of collective noun matters, for different terms 
mobilize different discourses, point to different opportunity structures, 
prioritize different interests. 
Faced with encroaching world domination by the major technology 
companies, our four authors are all rather pessimistic. Yet in an endorsement 
of user agency, each in his different way also issues a call to action—to users 
in general, and to us as critical scholars in particular. So how pessimistic 
should we be? We might retort to Gillespie that, just as readers in the print era 
dominated by the editorial logic could still differentiate Fox News from The 
New York Times, and viewers generally trust public service news on 
television more than commercial services, so too are Internet users striving to 
upgrade their digital literacy, while also finding that longstanding forms of 
critical literacy still stand them in good stead. Consider the example of 
Jackson’s consumer revolt against Apple’s abandonment of green recycling or, 
more modestly, the common view that Wikipedia is good for uncontentious 
facts but not for an election campaign update. Yet no simple overthrow of 
power, no straightforward celebration of user agency is plausible. Returning us 
to the circuit of culture, ever more complexly renegotiated at each site of 
articulation, Gillespie observes the “recursive loop” by which, “as these 
algorithms have nestled into people’s daily lives . . . , users shape and 
rearticulate the algorithms they encounter . . . [and then, in turn] algorithms 
impinge on how people seek information, how they perceive and think about 
the contours of knowledge, and how they understand themselves in and 
through public discourse” (chapter 9). So, although the circuit depends on 
users for its completion, and although their agency (or, as some would have it, 
the social contexts that condition their actions) render the circuit 
unpredictable, open to a measure of resistance even, this does not mean the 
circuit is led by—or works primarily in the interests of—the users. 
Indeed, as Roger Silverstone (2006) stressed, drawing on Michel de 
Certeau (1984), it is not often that the tactics of everyday life (what Gillespie 
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calls the tactics of “obfuscation”) succeed in circumventing or redirecting the 
strategies of established power. And the more media-literate the users become 
(as Downey hopes), the more those who stand to gain by “reading” the user 
will strive to stay ahead (Jenkins 2003). Yet, significantly, any optimism about 
countering the power of the major corporations (conceived in terms of labor 
management, algorithms, or design) calls on users as publics to demand what 
matters to the public sphere—inclusion, transparency, accountability, redress, 
fair representation, and so on. All of these were fought for in previous eras, 
through public discourse, and through legislative struggles, the establishment 
of regulators, and even the courts. For the most part, these are fights yet to be 
held in the digital era, though early instances are already mounting. Inevitably 
they will pitch the nation-state, speaking for its citizens, against globalized 
corporations, in a complex and compromised negotiation of interests as part of 
a new and increasingly transnational struggle over the determination of 
knowledge. Within this struggle, the user as worker, citizen, and ethical 
human being has a vital part to play. 
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